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Abstract 
This paper raises the question as to whether the United 
Nations peacekeeping forces could be awarded a civilian 
status during the armed conflict in which they are 
deployed; which is important for the determination of 
prohibition of attacks against them. The paper is based on 
the premise that distinction between civilians and 
combatants is crucial under international humanitarian 
law. In doing so, this paper briefly analyses the nature of 
UN peacekeeping operations and the qualification of the 
UN forces‟ members as civilians or combatants. It also 
delves into the emerging category of UN robust 
peacekeeping operations to ascertain whether its 
personnel would be treated as civilians or combatants in 
the context of an international armed conflict.  
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The complex combination of international and internal elements, 
the methods and weapons employed by the belligerents, the goals 
of the fighters, and the nature of the parties involved transform the 
classical internal armed conflict into one potentially threatening the 
international peace and security of the neighbouring states. In 
order to maintain and restore international peace and security as 
well as peace in the region, the international community has 
authorized the Security Council of the United Nations to determine 
the measures that are to be taken to prevent an aggravation of the 
situation. The Security Council can make use of the peaceful 
settlement of disputes according to Chapter VI of the UN Charter, 
or it can take coercive measures under Chapter VII, either 
involving use of armed force or not subject to the determination of 
the existence of any threat to peace, breach of peace, or act of 
aggression. Over the period of time, many UN peace operations 
have been deployed in international and internal armed conflicts, 
both as peacekeeping1 and as peace enforcement2 operations. The 
former permits the use of force only in self defence. The 
peacekeepers are considered civilians and enjoy special protection 
from armed attacks. In contrast, the peace enforcers may use armed 
force beyond self defence, which means that peace enforcers are 
allowed to engage in combats and therefore are legitimate military 
targets. This separation between peacekeeping and peace 
enforcement operations is not so clear in reality. In the recent times, 
most of the UN peace operations are neither peacekeeping nor 
peace enforcement, but a mixture of both, known as robust 
peacekeeping operations. This situation creates difficulty in 
determining a legitimate military target and in ascertaining as to 
                                                          
1 (E.g. UNOSOM I in Somalia and UNAMIR I, as well as AMIS in Sudan). 
2 (E.g. ONUC, IEMF and the United Nations Force Intervations Brigade 
FIB in the Democratic Republic of Congo; UNITAF, UNOSOM II in 
Somalia (at the begining); the Turquise Operation in Ruanda; ECOMOG 
in Sierra Leone and UNMIS in Darfur). 
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whether protection as per International Humanitarian Law (IHL) is 
afforded to the peace operations or not.3  
The aim of this paper is to put forward thoughts on determining 
the real nature of the robust peacekeeping operations‟ soldiers and 
to contribute to solving the questions related to their protection. 
Consequently, the first part of this paper presents the factual 
background regarding the deployment of UN peace operations. 
The second part portrays the various types of UN peace operations, 
including the robust peacekeeping operations as a special case 
among the traditional two. The third part analyses the possibility of 
the UN forces being engaged in hostilities as combatants, therefore 
becoming legitimate military targets according to IHL. 
UN Peacekeeping Operations: Factual Background 
The United Nations (UN) is an organisation created to save 
succeeding generations from the scourge of war.4 It is the principal 
institution for building, consolidating and exercising the authority 
of the international community, in order to fulfil the principles and 
purposes of the UN Charter, by endowing its decisions with 
legitimacy. The first and foremost obligation of the UN is to protect 
peace and security, as well as to promote international co-
operation, in order to solve, among other things, problems of social, 
economic and humanitarian nature and to encourage the respect 
for human rights and fundamental freedoms on a global scale.5 
Each UN member is obliged to protect the welfare of its own 
people and meet its obligations to the wider international 
community.6 However when a state does not or cannot fulfil this 
obligation, the international community needs to compensate for 
this failure by offering the required assistance through the UN. In 
case of acts of aggression, breach of peace, internal armed conflicts, 
                                                          
3 (E.g. MONUC and MONUSCO in Congo, UNOSOM II in Somalia, 
UNAMIR I and II in Rwanda, UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone, UNMIS and 
UNAMID in Darfur). 
4 Charter of the United Nations, Preamble. 
5 Charter of the United Nations art. 1, Oct. 24, 1945, 1 UNTS XVI.  
6 U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (2004), ¶ 29. 




or of serious violations of human rights, representing a threat to 
international peace, the UN can decide through the Security 
Council on the measures that shall be taken to maintain or restore 
peace and security; by the activation of the collective security 
system established in Chapter VI and VII of the UN Charter, 
together with Chapter VIII where the participation of regional 
organisations is required to execute the relevant resolutions.7 
The Safety Convention of the United Nations and Associated 
Personnel, 1994 provides that attacks against, or other mistreatment 
of personnel who act on behalf of the UN are unjustifiable and 
unacceptable, by whomsoever committed, and provides for the 
punishment of those who have committed such attacks8. Those who 
are personally involved in peacekeeping operations in accordance 
with the UN Charter are entitled to the protection given to civilians 
under the international law of armed conflicts and attacks on them 
are criminalized by International Criminal Law (ICL).9 However, 
not all military attacks against peace forces constitute a violation of 
the IHL; it depends on the UN mandate based on which the UN 
peace forces are deployed. The next section will portray the 
different types of UN peace operations that helps to determine the 
protection afforded to the UN peace forces.  
                                                          
7 Robert Cryer, The Security Council and Article 39: A Threat to Coherence?, 
1(2) J CONFLICT SECURITY LAW 161, 161-62 (1996); Lothar Brock, Von der 
humanitären Intervention zur Responsibility to Protect: Kriegserfahrung und 
Völkerrechtsentwicklung seit dem Ende des Ost-West-Konflikts, in FREIHEIT, 
FESTSCHRIFT FUR MICHAEL BOTHE 19, 23 (A. Frischer-Lescano et al. Eds.., 
2008); Fred Grünfeld, Human Rights Violations: A Threat to International 
Peace and Security,  in THE ROLE OF THE NATION-STATE IN THE 21ST 
CENTURY, HUMAN RIGHTS, INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS AND FOREIGN 
POLICY 427, 427 (M. Castermans-Holleman ed.,  1998); INGER ÖSTERDAHL, 
THREAT TO THE PEACE: THE INTERPRETATION BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF 
ARTICLE 39 OF THE UN CHARTER 26-7 (1998); Karel Wellens, The UN 
Security Council and New Threats to the Peace: Back to the Future, J CONFLICT 
SECURITY LAW 8, 15, 43-6 (2003); MICHAEL E. BROWN, THE INTERNATIONAL 
DIMENSIONS OF CONFLICT 594 (M. Brown ed. MIT Press, 1996). 
8 Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel 
art. 9, Dec. 09, 1994. 
9 The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8, Jul. 17, 1998.  
Tania Gicela Bolaños          Attacks on United Nations Peacekeeping Forces 
23 
 
UN Peace Operations 
To ensure international peace and security, the UN makes use of 
UN peace operations whose mandate invokes measures under 
Chapter VI (peacekeeping) or stronger measures described under 
Chapter VII (peace enforcement of the UN Charter). Over the years, 
the protection of civilians during the armed conflicts has been an 
imperative of the UN peace forces, which has enforced the special 
protection guaranteed under IHL. Nevertheless, situations may 
arise where the Security Council does not take a clear decision to 
enforce peace, but goes beyond traditional peacekeeping (robust 
peacekeeping), thereby affecting the legal status of the personnnel 
involved in UN peace operations. The three types of mandate are 
discussed below.   
Peacekeeping Operations 
One of the most important measures of the UN for the peaceful 
settlement of disputes is the peacekeeping operation based on 
Chapter VI of the UN Charter. In its origin, they were used only in 
international armed conflicts.10 However, the non-international 
armed conflicts or the internationalized ones became more 
frequent. While the term peacekeeping does not appear in the UN 
Charter, it was thought to work to preserve peace, where fighting 
had been brought to a halt.11 
The UN Secretary General defined peacekeeping operations as the 
“deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto 
with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving 
United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently 
civilians as well. Peacekeeping is a technique that expands the 
possibilities for both the prevention of conflict and the making of 
peace (through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter 
VI of the Charter of the United Nations).”12 
                                                          
10 Eno Robert Wundeh, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Respect 
for Human Rights, 24 SOUTH AFRICAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 76 
- 77 (1999). 
11 UN Doc. A/47/277/ (1992), ¶ 15. 
12 UN Doc. A/47/277 (1992), ¶ 20. 




Peacekeepers are lightly armed and their deployment does not 
imply the exercise of coercive military measures. Their deployment 
is based on the authorisation of the principal parties to the armed 
conflict and supported by their co-operation, the major principles 
governing them being self defence and impartiality.13 Their work is 
more akin to armed police than to standard combat.14 Hence, 
peacekeeping operations distinguish themselves from the others 
based on three principles that must persist: (a) establishment on the 
consent of the parties; (b) impartiality in functioning and (c) non 
use of force except in self defence. These principles were 
introduced by the UN Secretary General during the deployment of 
the first UN Peacekeeping Operation, the United Nations 
Emergency Force.15 
The traditional peacekeeping operations, as they are usually 
known, are composed of monitoring missions with unarmed 
personnel, and lightly armed military personnel, whose tasks differ 
from situation to situation, depending on the nature of the conflict 
and the specific set of challenges. Ordinarily, they are given 
responsibilities such as monitoring ceasefire, demilitarizing zones 
and facilitating the withdrawal of warring parties‟ troops.16 
Whether the characteristics of the traditional peacekeeping 
operations are enough to entitle the peacekeepers for the protection 
                                                          
13 NIGEL D. WHITE, KEEPING THE PEACE: THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE 
MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY (Manchester 
University Press, 3rd ed., 1997); UNITED NATIONS, THE BLUE HELMETS - A 
REVIEW OF UNITED NATIONS PEACE - KEEPING (New York United Nations 
3rd ed., 1996); Sally Morphet, UN Peacekeeping and Election - Montering, 
in UNITED NATIONS DIVIED WORLD 201 (Adam Roberts and Benedict 
Kingsbury ed., 2007); Shyla Vohra, Impartiality in United Nations Peace-
Keeping, 9(1) LEIDEN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 63, 76(1996). 
14 Eno Robert Wundeh, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Respect 
for Human Rights, 24 SOUTH AFRICAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
76, 77 (1999). 
15 UN Doc. A/3943 §127, Oct. 09, 1948. 
16 United Nations Peacekeeping, Mandates and the legal basis for 
peacekeeping, UNITED NATION ORGANISATION, available at, 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/pkmandates.shtml 
(last visited on May 18, 2015).  
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given to civilians under IHL in order to criminalize attacks on them 
will be analysed later in this article.  
Peace Enforcement Operations 
In order to restore international peace and security, the UN Charter 
encompasses in Chapter VII coercive measures, which involves the 
use of military force.17 The Security Council is the only authorised 
organ of the UN to order these measures prior to the determination 
of the existence of any threat to peace, breach of peace, or acts of 
aggression.18 
Peace enforcement operations are UN peace operations to maintain 
or restore international peace and security through the use, or the 
threat to use of military force.19 Coercive action is employed to 
enforce a ceasefire, to ensure compliance with the resolutions 
imposed by the Security Council, the IHL, and the human rights. 
The Security Council may utilize regional organizations and 
agencies for enforcement action under its authority and in 
accordance with the UN Charter. 
                                                          
17 MOHAMED A. OSMAN, THE UNITED NATIONS AND PEACE ENFORCEMENT: 
WARS, TERRORISM AND DEMOCRACY 52-53 (Ashgate Publishing, 2002); John 
Quigley, The "privatization" of Security Council Enforcement Action: a Threat 
to Multilateralism, 17 MICHIGAN JIL 249, 262 (1996);  TREVOR FINDLAY, THE 
USE OF FORCE IN UN PEACE OPERATIONS 376 (Sipri & Oxford University 
Press, 2002). 
18 Charter of the United Nations art. 39, Oct. 24, 1945, 1 UNTS XVI.  
19 United Nations Peacekeeping, Principles and Guidelines, UNITED NATIONS 
ORGANISATION,  available at   
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/principles.shtml (last 
visited on May 19, 2015); Headquarters Department of the Army, US 
Army's Field Manual - FM 100-23 Peace Operations, CENTRE FOR DISASTER 
MANGAEMENT AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, available at 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/100-
23/index.html (last visited on May 12, 2015);  Headquarters Department 
of the Army, Peace Operations Multi-service tactics, Techniques, and 
Procedures for Conducting Peace Operations, BITS, (Oct. 26, 2003) 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/3-07-
31/fm3_07x31.pdf. 




The mandate of the peace enforcement operations involves attacks, 
conducted inter alia to maintain and restore public security and 
order, to protect the delivery of humanitarian relief and to improve 
the humanitarian situation on the field, to monitor protected zones 
and important infrastructure of the country and to ensure both the 
forcible separation of belligerent parties and the definitive 
withdrawal of foreign military supporters of the armed conflict. 
Further, the mandate can also encompass the prevention of a civil 
war or other armed conflicts between the parties and improvement 
of security on the field.  
Since these kinds of UN operations are based on Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter, neither the authorisation of the legitimate government 
of the host state nor of any of the parties of the armed conflict is 
required for their deployment. They can be deployed even against 
the will of the belligerent parties20 and impartiality is not a 
requirement. 
Robust Peacekeeping Operations 
Given the nature and challenges of some armed conflicts, lightly 
armed soldiers may not be enough to maintain or restore peace. 
The use of military force is therefore required,21 although the 
                                                          
20 Hugo Slim, Military Humanitarianism and the New Peacekeeping: An 
Agenda forPeace? THE JOURNAL OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, (Sep. 22, 
1995),  https://sites.tufts.edu/jha/archives/64; Jane Boulden, Peace 
Enforcement: The United Nations Experience in Congo, Somalia, and Bosnia, 1 
POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY 117, 163 (2013); Jit Rikhye, Sovereignty and 
International Intervention in the Internal Affairs of States: Peacekeeping 
Operations, in THE DUMBARTON OAKS CONVERSATIONS AND THE UNITED 
NATIONS 73 (Ernest R. May and Angeliki E. Laiou eds., 1998); Nicholas 
Tsagourias, Consent, Neutrality/Impartiality and the Use of Force in 
Peacekeeping: their constitutional dimension, 11 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT AND 
SECURITY LAW 465, 469 (2006); George F. Oliver, The Other Side of 
Peacekeeping: peace enforcement and who should do it?, 8 INTL. PEACEKEEPING: 
THE YEARBOOK OF INTL PEACE OPERATIONS 102 (2004). 
21 Annan K, Statement by the United Nations Secretary-General Before the 
special commemorative meeting of the general assemby honouring 50 years of 
peacekeeping, INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING, (Oct. 06, 1998), 
http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/pk5060sg.htm; Geroge F Oliver, The 
Other Side of Peacekeeping: Peace Enforcement and Who Should Do It?, 8 
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Security Council does not use the provisions of Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter to enforce peace, but to ensure the compliance with the 
mandate of the peacekeeping operation. While conducting the 
operations to maintain peace, they are granted more powers than 
the traditional peacekeeping operations and by their nature belong 
to the coercive measures under Chapter VII. However, they do not 
become peace enforcement operations.22 This new sort of peace 
operations combines elements of the peacekeeping operations 
under Chapter VI with the use of force under Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter. They are generally known as peace operations of third 
generation and constitute the most frequent UN peacekeeping 
operations in the present times.  
The three basic principles that characterize a peacekeeping 
operation should be featured in a robust peacekeeping operation, 
although with some variations given the UN Mandate and the use 
of coercive measures. The basic principles are (a) establishment 
with the consent of the main parties; (b) impartiality in functioning; 
(c) non use of force except in self defence in a broad sense.23  
Owing to the express reference to Chapter VII of the UN Charter, 
robust peacekeeping operations are allowed to use „the necessary 
means‟ in order to fulfil the mandate given by the UN Security 
Council. The distinctive feature of these UN peace operations is the 
mandate, which emphasises on the protection and defence of 
specific persons and places, within the broad ambit of self 
defence.24 The notion of self defence in such broad sense 
encompasses the protection and defence of peacekeepers, UN 
                                                                                                                                    
INTL. PEACEKEEPING: THE YEARBOOK OF INTL PEACE OPERATIONS 101, 109 
(2002); KAREN MINGST & MARGARET KARNS, THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE 
POST-COLD WAR ERA 82 (Boulder, WestviewPress, 1995 2nd ed., 2000). 
22 N., Tsagourias, Consent, Neutrality/ Impartiality and the Use of Force in 
Peacekeeping: Their Constitutional Dimension, 11(3) J.C.S.L., 472 (2006). 
23 Speical Research Report, Special Research Report No. 1: Security Council 
Action Under Chapter VII: Myths and Realities, SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT, 
(Jun. 23, 2008), http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/special-research-
report/lookup-c-glKWLeMTIsG-b-4202671.php.  
24 U.N. Doc., A/55/305-S/2000/809 (2000); U.N. Doc., A/57/767 (2003) 4, 
¶ 26. 




installations, as well as ensuring the freedom of movement of peace 
keepers; affording protection to civilians under imminent threat, to 
personnel of nongovernmental organizations, to the most 
important locations and buildings of the country and to persons 
with protected status such as refugees, internally displaced 
persons, children, women and political leaders. This plethora of 
tasks exposes the peacekeepers to a high risk of accidental injury or 
of deliberate attack. 
Unlike peacekeeping operations, the authorisation to use force 
within the broad sense of self defence does allow the deployment 
of offensive or active military activities,25 which might achieve 
better results in maintaining the peace. These attributions justify 
the designation as robust peacekeeping operation. The consent of 
all involved parties or of the legitimate government will be sought 
before the deployment of the robust peacekeeping operation. 
Nevertheless their refusal does not hinder the UN mission. In order 
to determine whether there is some difference between the 
protection awarded to the UN peace forces of traditional 
peacekeeping, robust peacekeeping and peace enforcement 
operations, the next section of the article will analyse their 
participation in the hostilities.  
Legal Protection of the UN Peacekeeping Forces 
The UN does not have an army to maintain or restore the peace; it 
has to make use of either the army of the UN members or the army 
of regional organizations who for the purpose of establishing the 
legal status of the UN peace forces are classified in the same 
functional way. The legal protection accorded to the personnel of 
UN peace operations has civil and criminal dimensions. The scope 
                                                          
25 N.D. White, Keeping the Peace, THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE 
MAINTENANCE OF PEACE AND SECURITY, 228-9 (Manchester Univ Press; 2 
Sub edition 1998); Ove Bring, Peacekeeping and Peacemaking: prospective 
issues for the United Nations, 20 MULR 55, 60-1 (1995); David N. Gibbs, The 
United Nations, International Peacekeeping and the Question of “impartiality”: 
revisiting the Congo Operation of 1960, 38 J MOD AFR STUD 259, 360 (2000); 
(Some Examples are: MONUC in Congo; UNOSOM II in Somalia; 
UNAMIR in Rwanda; UNPROFOR in Bosnia). 
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of this article, however, is limited to discussing the protection 
against armed attacks. 
Although UN peace forces are engaged in armed conflicts, the 
primary source of authority is not IHL, but the specific mandate for 
that peace operation, issued by the Security Council or other (e.g. 
regional) executive body and the Rules of Engagement.26 Until the 
Safety of Personnel Convention 1994, there was no international 
convention that dealt directly with peacekeeping. When the UN 
peace operation enjoys the consent of the state, usually a status of 
force agreement exists between the UN and the host state 
governing the protection of those involved in the UN peace 
operations. 
The UN peace forces are part of the UN personnel and are 
considered representatives of the UN in the host state. The 
international community has given them significant protection and 
has special interest in criminalizing armed attacks on them. In 
particular, the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and 
Associated Personnel, 1994 criminalizes attacks against UN and 
associated personnel, as an offence, subject to universal 
jurisdiction.27 
Four elements must be satisfied in order to criminalize the attacks 
against UN peace forces. (a) The attack must be directed against 
personnel, installations, material, units or vehicles involved in a 
humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping mission in accordance 
with the UN Charter; (b) They must be the objects of the armed 
attack (intention); (c) They must be entitled to the protection given 
to civilians or civilian objects under IHL; (d) The actor must know 
or have reason to know that they are protected. Traditional 
                                                          
26 HUG BREAKEY, ANGUS FRANCIS, VESSELIN POPOVSKI ET AL., ENHANCING 
PROTECTION CAPACITY: POLICY GUIDE TO THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 
AND THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS, at 8, available at 
http://isp.unu.edu/publications/files/R2P_POC_Overview_Document.p
df; (last visited on Sep. 12, 2015); Kindred, Hugh M., The Protection of 
Peacekeepers, 33 CANADIAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 257, 263 
(1995). 
27 Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel 
art 9-16, Dec. 09, 1994.  




peacekeeping operations based on Chapter VI of the UN Charter, 
using force only in self defence as last resort, constitute a non-
combatant force. On the other hand, peace enforcement operations 
are based on the binding powers of the Security Council under 
Chapter VII and their deployment on the ground involves the use 
of force outside the purview of self defence. The peacekeepers are 
always considered as civilians and are subject to special protection 
from armed attacks. In contrast the peace enforcers are allowed to 
engage in combats and therefore are legitimate military targets.28 
Over the years, peacekeeping has evolved from a primarily military 
model of observing ceasefires and the separation of forces after 
inter-state wars, to incorporate a complex mode of many elements - 
military, police and civilians, working together to help lay the 
foundations for sustainable peace.29 These complex 
multidimensional operations (robust peacekeeping operations) 
demand accuracy in dealing with them, since the risk of casualties 
could frequently occur. However, the variety of functions among 
the robust peacekeeping personnel requires that a distinction also 
be made within the operation which is essentially of a military 
nature. 
This risk is exemplified by  the UN peace operations in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, where the staggering 
complexity of armed conflict obliged the Security Council to 
modify the traditional peacekeeping operation (MONUC) into a 
robust peacekeeping Operation (MONUSCO), and more recently to 
directly engage in offensive operations against target armed 
groups, in order to neutralize them by deploying a peace 
enforcement operation, FIB (Force Intervention Brigade). The 
                                                          
28 U.N. Doc. ST/SGB/1999/13, § 1; Devon Whittle, Application of 
International Humanitarian Law to United Nations Forces, 46 GEORGETOWN 
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 837, 840-41 (2015). 
29 United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, Principles and Guidelines, 
¶18.  
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robust peacekeeping operation still remains, providing logistical 
support, intelligence and direct liaison on the ground.30 
Intentionally directing attacks against personnel, installations, 
material, units or vehicles involved in humanitarian assistance or 
peacekeeping mission in accordance with the UN Charter is 
forbidden by IHL31 and is punishable under ICL32; as long as they 
are entitled to the protection given to civilians or civilian objects 
under the international law of armed conflict. This article examines 
the protection that needs to be afforded to the personnel of robust 
peacekeeping operations, while discussing their participation in 
hostilities. 
It is important to highlight that the concept of „civilian population‟ 
or „civilian‟ according to the Geneva Conventions 1949, refers to 
“persons who took no active part in the hostilities, or who were no 
longer taking an active part in the hostilities”.33 Thus civilians 
could be part of the population or they could be individuals who 
were formerly combatants. This concept functions in consonance 
with the concept of neutrality. 
                                                          
30 U.N.S.G., REP. NO. S/2015/486,  ¶¶ 19-22 at 6-7 (2015); Magdalena 
Pacholska, (Il)legality of Killing Peacekeepers, The Crime of Attaching 
Peacekeepers in the Jurisprudence of International Criminal Tribunals, 1 J INT 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE,  25 (2015); Devon Whittle, Application of International 
Humanitarian Law to United Nations Forces, 46 GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 837, 838-41 (2015). 
31 Rule 33: Personnel and Objects Involved in a Peacekeeping Mission, 
International Committee of the Red Cross, https://www.icrc.org/customary-
ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule33 (last visited on Sep. 09, 2015). 
32 The Rome Statute of International Criminal Court art. 8 b) (iii), Statute of 
the Special Court of Sierra Leone, art. 4 (b). 
33 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions, 12 August 1949; 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 
51(3), Jun. 08, 1977; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949, Protection of Victims  of Non-International Armed Conflicts 
(Protocol II) art. 13(3). 




Neutrality or Impartiality of the Robust Peacekeeping Operations 
Robust peacekeeping operations are impartial. They must protect 
civilians at risk and certain threatened places, without taking into 
account who is the attacker. Though the Security Council takes part 
in the armed conflict when it orders coercive measures, this 
partisanship does not however mean taking side in favour of one of 
the parties of the armed conflict. Indeed the Security Council takes 
the side of the civilians threatened by the internal armed conflict 
and of the surrounding states, whose stability can also be 
threatened by it. In doing so, the UN may lose its neutrality (if 
neutrality is understood as not taking part in an armed conflict)34, 
but this is the result of the execution of its functions as guardian of 
international peace and security. Impartiality or neutrality 
therefore means “adherence to the principles of the Charter and to 
the objectives of a mandate that is rooted in those Charter 
principles.”35 
Direct Participation in Hostilities 
As stated above, robust peacekeeping includes the use of military 
force.36 The UN peace forces are often deployed in combat zones. 
They have to be prepared to defend themselves and to carry out 
attacks and military actions as a typically belligerent party of an 
armed conflict. Both, peace enforcement and robust peacekeeping 
operations belong to the coercive measures under Chapter VII of 
the UN Charter. The difference between them lies in the UN 
Mandate. The mandate for robust peacekeeping operations is 
limited to self defence activities in a broad sense, while the 
mandate for peace enforcement operations authorizes the use of 
military force (even beyond the limits of self defence in a broad 
                                                          
34 ELADIO ARROYO LARA, LA NO BELIGERANCIA: ANALYSIS JURIDICO 126, 146 
(La Laguna ed., 1981). 
35 U.N. General Assembly-Security Council, Report of the Panel on United 
Nations Peace Operations, A/55/305/-S/2000/809 §50 (Aug. 21, 2000). 
36 DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INFORMATION, THE BLUE HELMETS: A REVIEW OF 
UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING 350, 4 (New York United Nations, 1985); 
MOHAMED A. OSMAN, THE UNITED NATIONS AND PEACE ENFORCEMENT: 
WARS, TERRORISM AND DEMOCRACY 17 (Ashgate Publishing, 2002). 
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sense), as far as it is necessary for the fulfilment of the UN Mission 
to enforce peace. Thus the latter are considered combatants and not 
subjects who can avail protection given to civilians under IHL. 
Robust peacekeeping operations on the contrary are authorized to 
use military force only within the limits of self defence in a broad 
sense and to ensure the compliance with the mandate.37 
However, peace enforcement operations as well as robust 
peacekeeping operations occasionally are given the same tasks, 
which makes the latter more likely to take an active part in 
hostilities, increasing its risk to be susceptible to attacks. However, 
it needs to be analysed as to whether the offences against the 
personnel of robust peacekeeping operations are punishable under 
international law. 
As observed by the Special Court of Sierra Leone (SCSL), the 
authorisation to use force under Chapter VII to these types of UN 
peace operations is limited to strictly prescribed circumstances38 
and consequently they are prohibited from engaging in hostilities39 
except in those foreseen situations. Thus, the fact that the UN peace 
forces were empowered under Chapter VII to use force in certain 
exceptional and restricted circumstances does not alter the 
                                                          
37Ademola Abbas, The United Nations, the African Union and the Darfur 
Crisis, 54(3) NETH. INT. LAW REV. 415, 430 (2007); Papastavridis, 
Interpretation of Security Council resolution under Chapter VII in the aftermath 
of the Iraqui Crisis, 56 ICLQ 83 (2007); Frederic L Krigis, Security Council 
Resolution 1441 on Iraq’s Final Opportunity to Comply with Disarmament 
Obligations, (Nov. 10, 2002) 
http://www.asil.org/insights/volume/7/issue/12/security-council-
resolution-1441-iraqs-final-opportunity-comply (last visited on Aug. 19, 
2015); Patrick McLaren, Settling the Score with Saddam: Resolution 1441 and 
Parallel Justifications for the Use of Force against Iraq, 13 DUKE JOURNAL OF 
COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 233 (2003); Ademola Abass, The 
Implementation of ECOWAS' New Protocol and Security Council Resolution 
1270 in Sierra Leone: New Developments in Regional Intervention, 10 U. MIAMI 
INT‟L& COMP. L. REV. 177, 185-86 (2001), available at 
http://repository.law.miami.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1143&cont
ext=umiclr (last visited on Aug. 19, 2015). 
38 SCSL Ruf Case, ¶ 1908. 
39 SCSL Ruf Case, ¶ 1917. 




fundamental nature of the robust peacekeeping operation, making 
it a peace enforcement operation. Instead, the reference to Chapter 
VII merely reinforces the right of the UN peace forces to use force 
in self defence in a broad sense based on the binding powers of the 
Security Council.40 
According to IHL, the UN peace forces are entitled to the protection 
given to civilians only insofar as they do not take a direct part in 
hostilities, otherwise they become combatants and therefore 
legitimate military targets. The use of force in self defence which 
includes defending oneself, defending others, defending property 
does not necessarily mean taking direct part in hostilities,41 but 
completing other tasks under the mandate.42 
The direct participation in hostilities involves “acts which by their 
nature or purpose, are intended to cause actual harm to the enemy 
personnel and material.”43 It implies a “direct causal relationship 
between the activity engaged in and the harm done to the enemy at 
the time and place where the activity takes place”. It can also be 
proved by the carrying of weapons and the clear willingness to use 
them beyond self defence.44 Hence, the personnel of robust 
peacekeeping operation are authorized to take „the necessary 
means‟ in order to fulfil the mandate given by the Security 
Council.They can therefore make use of force in a more active way 
rather than limiting it to resist attacks in order to defend oneself 
                                                          
40 SCSL Ruf Case, ¶ 1910-11. 
41 SCSL Ruf Case, ¶ 233. 
42 J. Solan, Peacekeepers under Fire: Prosecuting the RUF for Attacks against the 
UN Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone, 9 THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF 
INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNAS  243, 282-84 (2010). 
43 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Third Report on the 
Human Rights Situation in Colombia, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.102 Doc. 9 rev. 1, 
Feb. 26, 1999, ¶ 53. 
44 Prosecutor v Dusko Tadic [1997] I.C.T.Y. Judgement, Case No. IT-94-1-
T, 60 – 65.; Jean-François Quéguiner, Direct Partitipation in Hostilities under 
International Humanitarian Law, INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY OF THE RED 
CROSS 4-6 (Sep., 2003) https://www.icrc.org/ara/assets/files/ other/ 
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and others. Thus, by taking active part in hostilities, the difference 
between robust peacekeeping operations and peace enforcement 
operations is blurred. 
The SCSL also states that “in determining whether the 
peacekeeping personnel are entitled to civilian protection, the 
Chamber must consider the totality of the circumstances existing at 
the time of the alleged offence, including, inter alia, the relevant 
Security Council resolutions for the operation, the specific 
operational mandates, the role and practices actually adopted by 
the peacekeeping mission during the particular conflict, their rules 
of engagement and operational orders, the nature of the arms and 
equipment used by the peacekeeping force, the interaction between 
the peacekeeping force and the parties involved in the conflict, any 
use of force between the peacekeeping force and the parties in the 
conflict, the nature and frequency of such force and the conduct of 
the alleged victim(s) and their fellow personnel”.45 
Since robust peacekeeping operations are composed of different 
kinds of personnel with a variety of functions, another well known 
principle of IHL, i.e. the principle of distinction, must be taken into 
account in order to determine the afforded protection.46 Thus, 
distinction shall be made between civil, medical, police and 
military personnel. However only military personal involved in 
robust peacekeeping operations have the right to participate 
directly in hostilities in accordance with Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter.  
An armed attack against robust peacekeeping forces‟ personnel will 
therefore constitute a violation of IHL, if the UN peace forces are 
not taking direct part in hostilities; the military members on the 
other hand, whose function is to continuously take a direct part in 
hostilities (either in self defence in a broad sense or to fulfil its 
mandate) are granted the rights of combatants and do not enjoy the 
protection given to civilians. In this line the membership 
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approach47 commonly used to qualify personnel engaged in 
hostilities as combatants, can also be used to qualify the robust 
peacekeeping military personnel as combatants. Indeed they are 
part of one of the armies present in the host state. As such they are 
inducted into a military structure, have been trained as soldiers, 
they have the knowledge as to when to use appropriate military 
force, and also the capacity to do it. They are under a command 
responsible for the conduct of their subordinates, are subject to an 
internal disciplinary system, which enforces compliance with the 
rules of IHL, have a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance 
(usually blue berets) and carry arms openly.48Therefore they never 
appear and conduct themselves as civilians while carrying their 
weapons openly and wearing uniform during their deployment in 
an armed conflict. „Membership‟, for this purpose, would be 
interpreted as permanent active participation;49 that is as long as 
they are acting as soldiers, fulfilling a UN Mandate they are 
engaged from the beginning of the mission to its completion in a 
military deployment, distinguished thereby from the persons who 
sporadically participate in hostilities. 
Conclusion 
The UN peace forces, though not being civilians, enjoy a similar 
protection as long as they are not taking part in hostilities. Attacks 
on traditional peacekeeping operation personnel constitute a 
violation of IHL. Thus intentionally directing attacks against them 
is a punishable war crime. On the other hand UN peace 
enforcement operation personnel are considered as combatants and 
therefore a legitimate target. As regards UN robust peacekeeping 
operations‟ personnel, there is no uniform answer to the question. 
                                                          
47 Jann K. Kleffner, The Notions of civilians and Fighters in Non-International 
Armed Conflicts, Conduct of Hostilities Revisiting the Law of Armed Conflict, 
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF HUMANITARIAN LAW 67, 72 (Gian Luca 
Beruto, 2008); Nils Melzer, Direct Participation in Hostilities, I.C.R.C. 16, 33-
4, 71 (2009). 
48 Additional Protocol I art. 43 (1,2) (1977); Geneva Convention III relative 
to the Treatment of Prisioners of War art 4(2) (1949). 
49 KLEFFNER, supra note at 47.  
Tania Gicela Bolaños          Attacks on United Nations Peacekeeping Forces 
37 
 
Rather, their situation depends on their function and mandate 
within the robust peacekeeping operation. They are entitled to the 
protection given to civilians under the international law of armed 
conflict unless they are actively engaged as combatants.50 The 
military personnel of robust peacekeeping operations generally 
qualify as combatants. 
If the military personnel engaged in robust peacekeeping 
operations are entitled to the same protection as civilians, they 
would unduly benefit from a military advantage as against the 
other parties to the armed conflict. The UN forces would be 
allowed to attack the parties to the conflict at all times, while they 
would be legitimate targets only during the time when they 
actually, directly and actively participate in hostilities; during all 
other times they would be entitled to protection. Such a conclusion 
must be categorically denied. To give the military personnel, 
engaged in a robust peacekeeping operation, the special civilian 
protection would contradict the principle of distinction. They are 
combatants taking a direct part in hostilities while deployed in a 
military operation. As such they are distinct from the civil, medical 
and police personnel of the operation: attacks on whom are 
generally forbidden unless they engage in hostilities and only for 
such time as they take a direct part in hostilities. 
 
                                                          
50 United Nations Convention on the Safety of United Nations and 
Associated Personnel arts. 7, 9, U.N. Doc, ST/SGB/1999/13 (1999).  
